Though any association between Martin Heidegger and posthumanism may seem unlikely, I must admit, as a disclaimer, that such an association is not obvious. In fact, perhaps, it is certainly more likely to assume that Heidegger and posthumanism have absolutely nothing in common, and that the Heidegger’s preoccupations and the posthumanist concerns are mutually exclusive. The problem here, first, lies in not just how we read Heidegger, if situating our reading in Being and Time (1927), but also, secondly, it depends on how we define what posthumanism means—a specific understanding of the former is pivotal to how we can understanding the latter. On one hand, what Heidegger offers in Being and Time is an essentialist framework upon which we can build posthumanist thought as one of many ways of thinking in a post-Heideggerian manner—though Being and Time is incomplete in its current form, what it lacks provides a critical opening through which posthumanist thought develops. Of course, on the other hand, the question that must be asked is this: what kind of posthumanism? If there is an opening through which we can read Being and Time through posthumanism, what exactly would this kind of posthumanism look like and, furthermore, to what Heideggerian opening can it be applied?